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Abstract—High Performance Computing (HPC) systems 
traditionally allow their users unrestricted use of their internal 
network.  While this network is normally controlled enough to 
guarantee privacy without the need for encryption, it does not 
provide a method to authenticate peer connections.  Protocols 
built upon this internal network, such as those used in MPI, 
Lustre, Hadoop, or Accumulo, must provide their own 
authentication at the application layer.  Many methods have been 
employed to perform this authentication, such as operating 
system privileged ports, Kerberos, munge, TLS, and PKI 
certificates. However, support for all of these methods requires 
the HPC application developer to include support and the user to 
configure and enable these services.  The user-based firewall 
capability we have prototyped enables a set of rules governing 
connections across the HPC internal network to be put into place 
using Linux netfilter.  By using an operating system-level 
capability, the system is not reliant on any developer or user 
actions to enable security.  The rules we have chosen and 
implemented are crafted to not impact the vast majority of users 
and be completely invisible to them.  Additionally, we have 
measured the performance impact of this system under various 
workloads. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The merger of traditional HPC systems, big data clouds, 
and elastic computing clouds has highlighted new challenges in 
managing a combined SuperCloud.  One key challenge is 
addressing the security concerns that mixing this wide variety 
of applications brings to the system.  The ability for 
applications to operate among the many nodes of the system 
implicitly requires them to make use of the network in some 
manner.  However, on HPC systems the responsibility of 
ensuring the network is used securely has traditionally been 
delegated to each end-user’s application. 
Few applications are prepared to operate in this multiuser 
environment out of the box.  Configuring the appropriate 
security controls in an application, assuming it has the options 
for security controls at all, or API layers, such as MPISec I/O 
[Prabhakar 2009], is often regulated to the “Advanced 
Configuration” section of manuals, and the topic is skipped in 
many how-to guides.  Fewer solutions still are prepared to 
address the sharing of each distributed node among jobs of 
different users, each trying to use the network to communicate 
with their own distributed peers [Pourzandi 2005]. 
Even with services to assist users in standing up 
authenticated network connections, such as preprovisioned PKI 
certificates [Hunt 2001] in a virtual smartcard [Prout 2012] for 
use with TLS [Dierks 2008], bugs, poor documentation, and 
lack of user motivation prevent effective implementation of 
basic security measures.  Leaving the security to end-users’ 
applications is also particularly problematic when the 
application is still a work-in-progress.  Developers cannot be 
expected to have a fully featured and tested security subsystem 
guaranteed to be ready and implemented the first time they 
perform a test run of their application.  They must be given a 
development environment with enough security external to 
their application to allow for development and testing. 
Considering traditional system or network-level firewalling 
techniques to address these challenges immediately runs into 
problems.  The HPC scheduler can assign applications to run 
on any node in the system, different users can be sharing the 
same node, and users can utilize any unprivileged port number 
for their applications.  Multiple users sharing the same node 
require localhost-based connections to be controlled as well; 
these connections are necessarily out of scope of even dynamic 
firewall solutions that focus on perimeter security concerns 
[Wiebelitz 2009, Green 2004]. 
We have addressed these challenges by building a user-
based firewall into the HPC.  It operates on the system level for 
all applications without any modification and with a low 
overhead to the network speed.  The decisions made by this 
firewall are completely based on the user and group 
information of the processes on each end of the network 
communication and not the node they run on. 
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows.  
Section II describes the operational model and user experience 
of this system.  Section III describes the technologies used to 
create the user-based firewall: Linux Netfilter, Ident2, NetID, 
and the MIT SuperCloud system, which was used to conduct 
the performance measurements.  Section IV shows the 
performance results and overhead of the system.  Section V 
describes future work in this area.  Section VI summarizes the 
results. 
II. USER-BASED FIREWALL OPERATIONAL MODEL 
The primary goal of the MIT SuperCloud user-based 
firewall was to create a separation between network-enabled 
processes of one user and those of all other users, while 
ensuring that legitimate intentional network traffic is allowed to 
pass.  We started with the assumptions that the system 
implements the user private group model and that only system 
services are configured as exempt.  The goal of our user-based 
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firewall configuration is to allow connections if they meet one 
of the following rules: 
• connector process user matches the listener process user; 
or 
• connector process primary group or any of the 
supplemental groups match the listener process primary 
group; or 
• listening port is privileged (less than 1024); or 
• connector or listener process user is configured as exempt. 
With the rules above, we have ensured that any network 
services started by a user will by default be accessible only to 
that user.  However, if a user is working collaboratively and 
wishes to intentionally allow other users to access network 
services they start, he or she can change the primary group of 
their working session from their private group to the 
appropriate project group.  This change can be accomplished 
by using the newgrp or sg command and is preserved across 
job launches with both the Grid Engine and SLURM 
schedulers. 
III. TECHNOLOGIES 
A. MIT SuperCloud 
The MIT SuperCloud software stack enables traditional 
enterprise computing and cloud computing workloads to be run 
on an HPC cluster [Reuther 2013, Prout 2015].  The software 
stack runs on many different HPC clusters based on a variety of 
hardware technologies.  It supports systems with both 10 GigE 
and FDR InfiniBand running Internet Protocol over InfiniBand 
[RFC 4391]. 
The MIT SuperCloud software stack, which contains all the 
system and application software, resides on every node.  
Hosting the application software on each node accelerates the 
launch of large applications (such as databases) and minimizes 
their dependency on the central storage. 
B. Netfilter 
Netfilter is the packet-filtering framework of the Linux 
kernel.  It is often known to system administrators by the name 
of the userspace program that configures it: iptables.  Using 
this framework allows firewall rules to be implemented on a 
Linux-based system for packets entering or exiting the system, 
or even passing between programs within a system over the 
loopback adapter.  The desired behavior is achieved by loading 
and configuring together various netfilter modules.  Two 
modules, conntrack and queue, are critical to the operation of 
the user-based firewall. 
The netfilter conntrack module is used to track active 
connections.  This module allows the netfilter to be a stateful 
firewall for Linux.  By tracking a connection through its 
lifecycle, conntrack enables a simple way to permit follow-up 
packets on an existing connection to pass without a specifically 
crafted rule to match those packets in isolation.  By applying a 
simpler test to follow-up packets, conntrack allows more 
complex and resource intensive rules to be applied to the initial 
connection establishment without affecting long-term 
throughput. 
The netfilter queue module is used to dispatch packets to a 
user-space application for evaluation.  This application can 
then issue a verdict to drop, pass, or modify the packet.  The 
application can perform whatever additional processing it 
wishes prior to issuing a verdict on a packet. The kernel does 
limit how many packets can be waiting in the queue for a 
verdict, by default to 1024, so the application must ensure a 
timely verdict is issued on each packet to flush the queue.  If 
the queue reaches its limit, the default behavior is to drop all 
new packets. 
C. Ident2 
One of the key building blocks in enabling a user-based 
firewall is to identify the user of each end of a network 
connection.  This problem is not new, and has previously been 
solved by the ident protocol [RFC 1413] and its predecessor 
Authentication Service [RFC 912].  However the original 
protocol has certain drawbacks: it only works on TCP sockets, 
it is widely acknowledged to be a security risk because it leaks 
information about users of a system, and it only returned the 
basic username of the user. 
We developed a new daemon and protocol that we call 
ident2 that seeks to solve these drawbacks.  Our ident2 daemon 
running on each system provides a Unix domain socket to 
which applications submit queries for either local or remote 
network connections.  By using a Unix domain socket, we can 
use standard filesystem permissions to control who can access 
the ident2 service and the information it provides.  Our new 
ident2 protocol operates on UDP instead of TCP and requires a 
privileged port number to be used, ensuring our ident2 
daemons only speak to their peer ident2 daemons.  Along with 
IP range restrictions, these restrictions limit the ability to query 
our service and solve the unrestricted information leakage. 
Once a query for an IP and port pair has been received, 
either for a local connection or from a peer ident2 daemon, 
ident2 will query the kernel to find the associated socket 
number for the network connection. For TCP, this step is done 
via the Netlink NETLINK_INET_DIAG interface with the 
inet_diag_req structure.  For queries regarding UDP sockets, 
the output of /proc/net/udp is parsed instead, as inet_diag_req 
does not support UDP sockets. 
Mapping a socket number to detailed user information is not 
straightforward.  While network sockets do have a uid field, 
this is not the detailed information we are looking for.  For that 
we must map a socket back to its owning process.  This 
mapping can be accomplished by searching the list of open file 
handles for the socket.  This mapping is not deterministic 
however, as more than one process can have the same socket 
open simultaneously.  This indeterminism does not 
significantly affect our use case, as it would be unusual for 
multiple processes owned by different users to have open file 
descriptors to the same socket. 
Once an associated process for the socket is found, that 
process’s identity is queried and used to craft the reply, which 
includes the effective user that owns the process, the effective 
primary group, supplemental groups, and process identifier.  
This reply is then forwarded back to the peer ident2, if 
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necessary, and then back to the querier via the Unix domain 
socket. 
D. NetID 
The central component of our user-based firewall is the netid 
daemon. It acts as a netfilter queue endpoint, receiving packets 
from the netfilter queue and issuing verdicts as to whether 
those packets should be passed or dropped. Upon receiving a 
packet from the queue, the service will query ident2 for both 
the local and remote user information.  Upon receiving a reply 
from either query, it will make a preliminary check to 
determine if the connection can be allowed based on the one 
response.  A connection could be allowed based on only one 
response if the connecting or listening user is configured to be 
exempt from the user-based firewall rules, which is done for 
many system services.  Otherwise, the daemon will continue to 
wait until both queries are answered, or a predefined timeout is 
reached. 
Once both queries are answered, the daemon will make a 
decision on the packet.  If an accept verdict is issued on a 
packet, the connection completes normally.  The netfilter 
conntrack module will add the connection to its tracking list, 
and the netfilter rule to send the packet to the queue will not 
trigger again for this connection.  If the connection is denied, a 
drop verdict is issued and an ICMP destination unreachable 
notification is sent to the originating host.  In the case of a TCP 
connection, this ICMP error message will also indicate to the 
source system that the automatic retry mechanism should stop 
attempting to connect.  If the timeout is reached, a drop verdict 
is issued, but no ICMP notification is sent as retries could be 
appropriate. 
IV. PERFORMANCE 
The performance of netfilter and conntrack have already 
been well explored [Hoffman 2003, Kadlecsik 2004].  By 
utilizing the existing netfilter conntrack module we are able to 
limit the impact of our user-based firewall to a delay in 
connection initiation. 
We have benchmarked two metrics for performance of the 
user-based firewall: overall throughput and connection 
initiation delay.  We performed these tests on an HPC system 
utilizing 10 GigE for its interconnection.  To test the overall 
throughput, we transferred increasing amounts of data through 
a single TCP network connection using netcat.  To test the 
connection initiation delay, we timed how long it took to create 
1000 new TCP network connections and transfer one byte with 
an increasing number of threads. 
As expected, the bulk data transfer showed an imperceptible 
difference between the measurements with and without the 
user-based firewall.  The netfilter conntrack module, which is 
widely used and has been well optimized for exactly this use 
case, ensures that the user-based firewall only has to validate 
the first packet of the TCP connection. 
The rapid connection use case showed a much greater 
impact.  We saw approximately a 90% increase in total time 
taken to complete the test for 1 to 7 threads (1,000 to 7,000 
total connections).  When reaching 8 threads and higher, the 
impact began to rise significantly. 
To mitigate the impact of this performance hit, we 
developed a library that could be integrated into a user’s 
application by using the LD_PRELOAD environment variable 
to notify ident2 in advance of sockets created by that process.  
This precaching of socket to process mapping reduced the 
impact to approximately 35% on the 1 to 5 thread tests.  At 
greater than 8 threads, this precaching is no longer beneficial in 
its current form.  Further optimizations are likely possible to 
the cache handling and we may explore them in the future. 
V. FUTURE WORK 
In the future, we will migrate ident2 from the inet_diag_req 
structure to the inet_diag_req_v2 structure and investigate 
better ways of handling UDP traffic.  The inet_diag_req_v2 
structure became available in the Linux kernel version 3.3.  Our 
hope is that changing to the inet_diag_req_v2 structure will 
improve performance by allowing more precise connection 
Figure 1.  Time to complete transfers of various sizes by using a 
single-threaded netcat command with and without the user-based 
firewall enabled. 
Figure 2.  Time to complete 1000 new connections per thread and to 
transfer one byte each via netcat, without the user-based firewall, 
with the user-based firewall, and with the precache feature. 
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matching in the kernel and enabling us to query UDP 
information from Netlink instead of proc. 
Future work will also investigate better ways of handling 
UDP traffic.  Assigning “listener” and “connector” roles to 
UDP traffic to align with our operational model’s rules is an 
imperfect fit.  Additionally, “fire and forget” UDP programs 
can close their sockets or terminate before we query their 
information, leading to improper packet drops. 
VI. SUMMARY 
The user-based firewall we have implemented seamlessly 
applies the concept of user ownership to network traffic within 
an HPC cluster for the vast majority of workloads.  The user-
based firewall requires no changes to users’ code to be 
implemented and minimal changes to their working patterns 
when they need to work collaboratively with other users or 
have a high rate of short connections. 
The protections provided by our user-based firewall have 
already enabled our team to develop and deploy solutions that 
integrate third-party software faster by allowing us to avoid 
extensive effort that would have been required to integrate 
security directly into those tools.  As the user-based firewall is 
based solely on process identity, it is agnostic to the user’s 
initial authentication method to the system and is not reliant on 
a password-based authentication model.  We have integrated 
ident2 support into our existing web portal efforts that support 
smartcard login [Reuther 2010].  By extending the same rules 
from the operational model to websocket forwarding through 
the portal, we have been able to rapidly enable new use cases 
for the system. 
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